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Abstract
This article examines how human rights relate to democratic policing. We differentiate 
policing for democracy, which protects democracy, from democratically responsive 
policing, where police are governed democratically. Using this two-fold distinction to 
examine European Court of Human Rights cases, we find a close match between Con-
vention rights and policing for democracy. Regarding democratically responsive polic-
ing, the Court provides responsiveness within the structural limits of reacting to indi-
vidual complaints, and as one element in the broader landscape of governance. 
Further, cases show how that landscape features in Court judgments. We argue that 
robust enforcement, and careful attention to case law during drafting and implemen-
tation of police legislation and governance arrangements, help protect democracy and 
enhance democratically responsive policing.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between democratic policing and democratic government 
has been described as ‘symbiotic’.1 Likewise, human rights and democracy are 
often explored in terms of their inter-relatedness.2 It follows that democratic 
policing and human rights are related, and indeed they are often spoken about 
in proximity. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe sees 
the protection of human rights as one dimension of democratic policing.3 De-
mocracy and human rights appear together in the preamble to the Patten 
 Report on policing in Northern Ireland, and the Commission’s tests of police 
reform proposals amount to five common indicators of democratic policing 
and one of human rights.4 Kartay and colleagues include police attitudes to 
human rights as one variable when assessing democratic policing in Turkey.5 
Jones and colleagues do not explicitly reference human rights among criteria 
of democratic policing in their foundational contribution, yet elsewhere, En-
gels and Burruss use the same criteria to demonstrate policing which adheres 
to human rights standards.6 The mutual interdependence of rights and de-
mocracy features in Neyroud and Beckley’s analysis of police ethics.7 A three-
way nexus between policing, democracy and human rights is most evident in 
1 R. Neild, ‘Democratic Police Reform in War Torn Societies’, Conflict, Security and Develop-
ment, 2001, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 21–43. doi: 10.1080/14678800100590596. For one of the earliest 
statements on the relationship, see also D. Bayley, The Police and Political Development in In-
dia, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1969.
2 J. Dryzek, ‘Can there be a Human Right to an Essentially Contested Concept? The Case of 
Democracy’, The Journal of Politics, 2016, vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 357–367. doi: 10.1086/684585.
3 osce Guidebook on Democratic Policing, 2008, 2nd edition, Vienna, osce, p. 9. See also D. 
Bayley, Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006, p 19; B. Goold, ‘Policing and Human Rights’ in B. Bradford, B. Jauregui, I. Loader 
and J. Steinberg (eds) Sage Handbook of Global Policing, London: Sage, 2017, pp. 226–240, at 
p. 232; J. Hornberger, ‘Human Rights and Policing: Exigency and Incongruence’, Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science, 6, pp. 259–283, at p. 267. doi: 1550–3585/10/1201–0259.
4 A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland – The Report of the Independent Commission on 
Policing for Northern Ireland, 1999. Retrieved 30 May 2016, http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/
police/patten/patten99.pdf.
5 A. Kartay, M. Wiatrowski, J. Vardalis and K. Bowen, ‘An Assessment of Democratic Policing in 
Turkey’, International Journal of Police Science and Management, 2012, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 299–
311. doi: 10.1350/ijps.2012.14.4.291.
6 S. Engel and G Burruss, ‘Human rights in the new training curriculum of the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland’, Policing: an International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 
2004, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 498–511. doi: 10.1108/13639510410566244. For the criteria and the un-
derlying concept of democracy, see T. Jones, T. Newburn and D. Smith, Democracy and Polic-
ing, 1994, London, Policy Studies Institute, pp. 36–48.
7 P. Neyroud and A. Beckley, Policing, Ethics and Human Rights, 2001, Cullompton, Willan, p. 60.
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Kutnjak-Ivković and Borovec’s study of Croatia which, while not using case 
law, identifies the most relevant rights in the European Convention on Human 
Rights (echr).8
This paper goes further in examining the overlap between democratic polic-
ing and human rights. Firstly, it uses a conceptual distinction from criminology 
between policing which protects and sustains democracy (policing for democ-
racy) and policing directed and governed in line with specific democratic prin-
ciples (democratically responsive policing).9 Secondly, it integrates a wider set 
of Convention rights than those included by Kutnjak-Ivković and Borovec. 
Thirdly, it uses the conceptual frame to interrogate relevant cases decided at 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) identified through the hudoc 
database.10 Examining the relevant articles and principles of the echr11 in 
light of a distinction between policing for democracy and democratically re-
sponsive policing reinforces the value of separating out these two dimensions 
and the mapping exercise produces a fine-grained understanding of how hu-
man rights frameworks relate to democratic policing. We show a close match 
between policing in line with human rights obligations and policing for de-
mocracy, particularly in relation to Articles 2 and 3 (life, and prohibition on 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment); 5 (liberty and security), and more 
explicitly ‘political’ rights covered in articles 8 through 11 and Protocol 1.3. On 
the other hand the needs of democratically responsive policing are only par-
tially met by policing in the framework of the echr, as may be anticipated 
from literature on police governance. Nonetheless, the Court currently facili-
tates responsiveness to citizens, especially as a mechanism of redress, and in 
important ways supports a system of police responsiveness to other institu-
tions. Here, while specific articles are of note (particularly 5, 6 and 13), it is the 
more general function of the Court that cements its place in a democratically 
responsive framework of police governance. Ultimately, we propose that care-
ful attention to Convention rights and principles during drafting and imple-
mentation of legislation, and robust enforcement of the convention, enhance 
both forms of democratic policing.
8 S. Kutnjak-Ivković and K. Borovec, ‘Protecting Human Rights: a Complex Story of the De-
mocratisation of the Croatian Police’, International Journal of Comparative and Applied 
Criminal Justice, 2018, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 1–31, at p. 6. doi: 10.1080/01924036.2016.1270841.
9 A. Aitchison and J. Blaustein, ‘Policing for Democracy or Democratically Responsive Po-
licing? Examining the Limits of Externally Driven Police Reform’, European Journal of 
Criminology, 2013, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 496–511. doi: 10.1177/1477370812470780.
10 https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=caselaw/HUDOC&c=.
11 echr is taken as a firmly institutionalised framework for Human Rights which covers 47 
of the 57 osce member states.
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As Human Rights focuses largely on states,12 we only examine public police 
agencies. While the work is focused on Europe and at the level of ECtHR, simi-
lar issues are evident elsewhere, and the analysis could be extended outwards 
to review police in other states,13 or inwards to examine domestic decisions on 
Convention rights.14 In the following we elaborate on the distinction between 
the two concepts of democratic policing and outline our approach before tak-
ing each form of democratic policing in turn, examining how they are served 
and illustrated by ECtHR judgments.
2 Democratic Policing
When separating policing which supports political democracy from policing 
which is democratically responsive, Aitchison and Blaustein were concerned 
about overly-powerful external influences driving policing in a small, fragile 
state.15 External intervention can help protect an emerging democracy, but can 
also skew the locus of policing decisions away from domestic constituencies. 
In spite of the focus on emerging democracies, the distinction is analytically 
useful in established democracies, and can be applied to the diverse states that 
have signed or ratified the echr. The concept of democracy employed is one 
which goes beyond procedural dimensions to incorporate the capacity for 
public debate of policy alternatives.16
Policing for democracy recognises police forces need not be democratical-
ly governed to support core elements of democratic government. The focus is 
largely on police actions and behaviour. This means restraining from intimidat-
ing acts or the use of oppressive force, and acting in ways in which personal 
12 S. Burbidge, ‘The Governance Deficit: Reflections on the Future of Public and Private Po-
licing in Canada’, Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 2005, vol. 47, no. 1, 
pp. 63–86. doi: 10.3138/cjccj.47.1.63.
13 M. Marks and J. Wood, ‘South African Police at a Cross Roads: the Case for a ‘Minimal’ and 
‘Minimalist’ public police’, Theoretical Criminology, 2010, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 311–329. doi: 
10.1177/1362480610369785; Sampson, I.T. ‘The Right to Demonstrate in a Democracy: an 
Evaluation of Public Order Policing’, African Human Rights Law Journal, 2010, vol. 10, no. 2, 
pp. 432–56. With adaptions to account for different frameworks, procedures and contexts, 
the approach we take here could be applied to domestic jurisdictions with their own or 
international rights instruments, or to other international venues such as the African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
14 We return to our rationale for focusing on ECtHR in discussing methods, below.
15 Aitchison and Blaustein, ‘Policing for Democracy or Democratically Responsive Policing?’ 
p. 497.
16 Ibid. p. 498.
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political views and commitments do not shape professional practice. It also en-
tails a range of positive obligations to protect the functioning of constitutional 
bodies, electoral processes and the surrounding free public dialogue. The effec-
tive and equitable provision of a secure space in which free political action and 
communication can take place constitutes policing for a democracy.17
Democratically responsive policing is wider and focuses on the mechanisms 
and structures surrounding police policy and action. As will be seen in the anal-
ysis, this can go beyond the police to include, for example, prosecutorial and 
judicial bodies. This makes it more accurate to talk of democratically respon-
sive police systems, recognising that the borders of ‘policing’ go beyond just the 
‘police’. Although overlooked in Aitchison and Blaustein’s work on police and 
democracy, the idea of a police system is well-established in the policing 
literature,18 and helps to locate police action in relation to the processes and 
actors that play a role in shaping it. Following Kuper, Aitchison and Blaustein 
focused on democratic police governance as characterised by responsiveness.19 
This demands that policing is shaped in response both to the population of a 
polity (vertical responsiveness) and to other institutions (horizontal respon-
siveness). Commonly identified features of democratic policing feed into 
structures which demand police respond to citizens and to legal and political 
institutions. These features speak to vertical aspects (redress, participation, re-
action, accessibility), horizontal aspects (competition, distribution of power, 
accountability) or both (information). Vertical forms of responses refer to a 
more direct means by which citizens can signal their interests to the state, 
whereas horizontal responsiveness defines an institutional arrangement that 
favours different authorities in a relationship requiring compromise and con-
sensus building to maximise the system’s responsiveness “to the views and best 
interests of the public.”20 This responds to the epistemic impossibility of a 
single perspective representing ‘perfect knowledge’ or the ‘totality of political 
knowledge’.21 As such, Kuper proposes multiple authorities dependent on each 
other to fulfil their functions22 and presenting each other with “an ongoing and 
credible threat of exposure and sanction.”23 Aitchison and Blaustein, following 
17 Ibid. p. 499.
18 R.I. Mawby, ‘Models of Policing’ in T. Newburn (ed.) Handbook of Policing, Cullompton: 
Willan, pp. 15–40, at 15.
19 Ibid. pp. 500–502, drawing on A. Kuper, Democracy beyond Borders: Justice and Representa-
tion in Global Institutions, 2004, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
20 Kuper, Democracy beyond Borders, p. 78.
21 Ibid. pp. 115–116.
22 Ibid. p. 103.
23 Ibid. pp. 107 and 102–104.
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Loader and Walker, qualify ‘response’ to include a reasoned rejection of citi-
zens’ wishes.24 Not all features are addressed here. For example, the dimension 
of competition is specific to contexts where police compete against other, often 
private, service providers which goes beyond the scope of the paper. Further, 
the wider landscape of police governance, and elements of democratic respon-
siveness that relate less to the individualised focus of a human rights court are 
not addressed in detail.25 We do not argue that the Convention and Court pro-
vide an exhaustive account of democratically responsive police. Rather, they 
highlight important mechanisms in a landscape of governance which support 
responsiveness, and the Court serves as one such mechanism in its own right.
3 Methods
In the following sections, we link convention rights and case law to the two 
dimensions of democratic policing. This was done through a two-stage pro-
cess. First, based on our reading of the literature on democratic policing, we 
undertook a process of conceptual mapping, identifying likely linkages be-
tween the two forms of democratic policing and the articles of the echr. Sec-
ond, we undertook a review of case law in which police or police systems play 
a key role. The review utilised the hudoc database, and proceeded on an ar-
ticle by article basis where we had a credible conceptual basis for linking the 
right to democratic policing. We focused only on cases rated as ‘key’ or ‘high 
importance’ in the database,26  and used text searches to find those relating to 
24 Aitchison and Blaustein, ‘Policing for Democracy or Democratically Responsive Policing?’ 
p 500; Loader and Walker, Civilizing Security, pp. 227 ff. See also Kuper, Democracy beyond 
Borders, p 104.
25 A. Malik, ‘Police Governance and Accountability in Scotland Following Reform: Revisiting 
the Policy Rationale for the Creation of the Scottish Police Authority’, Scottish Affairs, 
2019, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 438–464, doi: 10.3366/scot.2018.0257. Malik gives a detailed exami-
nation and critique of the Scottish Police Authority as one such generalised oversight 
mechanism whose remit operates above the level of the individual. For an account of a 
local forum for participation, and theorisation of its limits, see D. Harkin, ‘Simmel, the 
police form and the limits of democratic policing’ British Journal of Criminology, 2015, Vol 
55, no. 4, pp. 730–746. doi: 10.1093/bjc/azv018.
26 Key cases are selected by the Bureau of the Court (i.e. the President, Vice-Presidents and 
Section Presidents) on the proposal of the Jurisconsult, based within the Court Registry, 
and reflect the cases deemed most important. See e.g. ECtHR, Key Cases 2019, https://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Cases_list_2019_ENG.pdf. Prior to proposal and selection, 
cases are given a provisional ranking, with 1 indicating cases of ‘high importance’ which 
make a “significant contribution to the development or modification [of the Court’s] case 
law, either generally or in relation to a particular state”, see information note (‘?’) to the 
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police before more detailed reading.27 Rather than producing a classic doctri-
nal approach to the case law, we offer a review of cases and underlying rights 
informed by the conceptual literature on democratic policing which is largely, 
though not exclusively, located in criminological scholarship as highlighted in 
the previous two sections. Applying this framework to the Court’s outputs 
draws validity from two factors. First while the Convention is applied domesti-
cally in many states, the Court enjoys particular authority in its interpretation 
of rights28; and secondly the active participation of the Court in a landscape of 
police governance. The Court thus contributes both conceptually and empiri-
cally to the space of interest at the intersection of human rights and demo-
cratic policing.
4 Policing for Democracy 1: Equitable, Effective Security of Person 
(Articles 2 and 3)
If part of securing democracy is providing basic security to citizens, allowing 
them to pursue lawful activities including, but not limited to, a range of demo-
cratic rights linked to open public debate (free speech, free assembly), then a 
state force that kills or physically attacks citizens is acting in an anti- democratic 
way. This is the case regardless of whether such action is targeted or arbitrary, 
but selectively targeted violence brings in a new dimension of anti-democratic 
policing by closing down specific forms of oppositional political activity. 
In  terms of the echr, the key articles here are Article 2 (right to life) and 
 Article 3 (freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment), along-
side Article 14 (non-discrimination). Equally, a state failing to protect citizens, 
‘Importance’ heading at the database, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22documentcol
lectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22]}.
27 Our cases cover 24 different state parties and judgments rendered between 1988 and 2019. 
The account is not specific to one period or national jurisdiction, and favours conceptual 
mapping over context-specific coherence at this stage. We did not adopt a chronological 
approach in our analysis, but as a further step, it would be possible to analyse the evolu-
tion of the Court’s position in relation to human rights, democracy and police.
28 A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process, 4th edition, 2010, at 29; M. O’Boyle, 
‘The Future of the European Court of Human Rights’, German Law Journal 2011, vol. 12, no 
10, pp. 1862–1878, at 1868; this authority, and related legitimacy, is not unqualified, and 
maintaining this authority can shape decision making, as examined in F. de Londras, 
‘Dual functionality and the persistent frailty of the European Court of Human Rights’, 
European Human Rights Law Review, 2013, no. 1, pp. 38–46; F. de Londras and K. Dzeht-
siarou, ‘Managing Judicial Innovation in the European Court of Human Rights’, Human 
Rights Law Review, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 523–547.
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and to give all citizens equal protection, is, if not anti-democratic, at least fail-
ing as a democracy. While Articles 2 and 3 are non-derogable and are to be in-
terpreted independently of their relationship to democracy,29 we are arguing 
that they are fundamental to policing for democracy.
4.1 Life and Integrity: Restraint
In cases handling Articles 2 and 3 featuring absences of restraint by police, we 
examine three forms of anti-democratic policing: direct killings; non-lethal 
violence against marginalised or excluded groups; and non-lethal violence to-
wards formal, informal or perceived sources of opposition to state authorities. 
Many cases handling alleged substantive breaches of the right to life by state 
police concern deaths, abductions and disappearances in the North Caucasus 
region of the Russian Federation.30 These cases are extreme in terms of fre-
quency, the unsettled contexts in which they occur, the intent of state actors, 
and the state’s lack of convincing explanation for events that evidently involve 
state functionaries. There is little merit in analysing them further. Rather, like 
the Court in Dalakov, we reiterate that the right to life is a fundamental value 
in democratic societies31 and these are fundamentally anti-democratic acts.
Two further cases of killing by state police arise in the specific context of 
protests. These are significant for the unwarranted loss of life and in terms of 
the possible effect on freedom of assembly (Article 11). In both Nagmetov v Rus-
sia and Ataykaya v Turkey, tear gas canisters fatally struck the applicants’ sons 
during protests.32 In the former, the Russian government accepted that 
the  manner in which the officer fired the weapon was in breach of domes-
tic law, while in the latter, where the victim was a bystander rather than a pro-
testor,  the Turkish government argued that the use of weapons was legally 
 mandated. 33 The lack of legal provisions, and corresponding training, ensur-
ing appropriate use of weapons in a non-lethal manner (i.e. firing at a high 
angle rather than along a horizontal trajectory), amounted to a failing of the 
state to meet positive obligations under Article 2.34
29 Ashworth and Redmayne, Criminal Process, at 37 and 48.
30 Chechen Republic and the Republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia and North Ossetia-Alania. 
See, e.g. Nazyrova and Others v Russia, ECtHR, 21126/09, 63620/09, 64811/09, 32965/10 and 
64270/11, 9 February 2016; Aliyev and Gadzhiyeva v Russia, ECtHR, 11059/12, 12 July 2016; 
Gaysanova v Russia, ECtHR, 62235/09, 12 May 2016 among others.
31 Dalakov v Russia, ECtHR, 35152/09, 16 February 2016, para. 61.
32 Nagmetov v Russia, ECtHR 35589/08, 30 March 2017; Ataykaya v Turkey, ECtHR 50275/08, 
22 July 2014.
33 Ataykaya v Turkey, para. 42.
34 Ibid, paras 57–58.
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Ciorcan and others v Romania, brought by 37 Roma residents of Reghin, ex-
amines potentially lethal police violence. The case concerns police action 
against a minority group widely recognised as marginalised and excluded from 
the public sphere across Europe.35 We return to the broader issue of marginali-
sation in discussing dignity, below. Local and special police forces deployed to 
serve a summons on two Roma men after an initial complaint from a local of-
ficer concerning insulting behaviour. The manner of deployment did not fit 
with any reasonable anticipation of resistance and officers used dispropor-
tionate force, including firing live ammunition towards a crowd.36  The Court 
found a substantive breach of Article 2, but owing to a lack of concrete evi-
dence, arising from state failures in conducting a full investigation, did not find 
a substantive breach of Article 3. In the matter of discrimination (Article 14), 
the Court criticised the intervention, but found insufficient grounds to con-
clude racist motive for state agents’ actions.37 In part, this resulted from inad-
equate investigation of the events by the state party, which itself forms the 
basis for an Article 14 violation.38 This highlights an issue with rights protec-
tion mechanisms: They are only as good as the evidence-gathering that sup-
ports findings. Where these are in the hands of those being scrutinised, any 
systemic racism underpinning a breach of rights would logically obstruct the 
investigation of racism as the reasons for that breach.39
35 Ciorcan and others v Romania, ECtHR, 29414/09 and 44841/09, 27 January 2015, revised 17 
January 2017. On marginalisation see, for example, L.L. Herakova, ‘Identity, Communi-
ty,  Inclusion: the Roma and (New) Europe’, Journal of International and Intercultural 
 Communication, 2009, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 279–297. doi: 10.1080/17513050903177318; J. Škrijel, 
‘Common Obstacles towards Democracy: the Protection of Roma Rights in Romania and 
Macedonia’, pecob’s Volumes, 2014/15, Bologna, pecob, pp. 17–35.
36 Ciorcan and others v Romania, para 111, in para 156 the deployment was described as ‘gross-
ly excessive’. Elsewhere under the heading of Article 3 the importance of a robust opera-
tional planning process is identified, see e.g. Rehbock v Slovenia, ECtHR 24692/95, 28 
 November 2000, para. 72 and Gutsanovi v Bulgaria, ECtHR 34529/10, 15 October 2013, paras 
131–133, 136–137.
37 Ibid, para. 163.
38 Ibid, paras 164–167.
39 Also, in Bekos and Koutropoulos v Greece, ECtHR 15250/02, 13 December 2005, The same 
issue is evident in that there was insufficient evidence for the Court to find a substantive 
violation of Article 14, but this stemmed from failures to investigate a racist motivation for 
police abuse of two Roma men, itself the basis for a procedural Article 14 violation. At the 
time of writing, the Court had just released its judgment in Lingurar v Romania, ECtHR 
48474/14, 16 April 2019. In this case, the judgment found two Article 14 violations in addi-
tion to an Article 3 violation arising from injuries inflicted on members of a Roma family 
during a raid by gendarmes. Here the Court was able to find evidence of discrimination in 
the form of ethnic profiling which resulted in the disproportionate deployment and use 
of force in the initial raid, and in the Romanian prosecutor and court’s dismissal of the 
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Police violence against political opposition is evident in Virabyan v Arme-
nia, in which an opposition party member involved in Presidential elections 
was detained and seriously assaulted.40 The degree of the assault, and the in-
ference that it was carried out to punish or intimidate the applicant, supported 
a finding of torture, breaching Article 3.41 Considering this breach alongside 
Article 14 on non-discrimination, the Court outlines part of the rationale for 
the oft repeated claim42 that Article 3 represents a fundamental value of dem-
ocratic societies and the need for police, as state agents, to respect it:
Political pluralism, which implies a peaceful co-existence of a diversity of 
political opinions and movements, is of particular importance for the 
survival of a democratic society based on the rule of law, and acts of vio-
lence committed by agents of the State which are intended to suppress, 
eliminate or discourage political dissent or to punish those who hold or 
voice a dissenting political opinion pose a special threat to the ideals and 
values of such society.43
The case again highlights a limit of the Court as a rights protection mecha-
nism. In the same way that it was unable to determine a racist motivation for 
police actions in Ciorcan, it could not objectively verify evidence that would 
provide a firm basis to conclude that the assault in Virabyan was rooted in po-
litical discrimination.44 Again, systems for providing and verifying evidence 
were lacking in the state under scrutiny. The breaches described so far give a 
good account of different aspects of anti-democratic policing.
4.2 Life and Integrity: Positive Obligations
Beyond protecting individuals from direct harm at the hands of state agents, 
Articles 2 and 3 carry positive obligations for states to protect the lives and 
physical safety of those within their jurisdiction. Following on from the discus-
sion of Ciorcan above, Opuz v Turkey handles state responses to threats to the 
applicants’ complaints (paras 74–82). For a summary of the development of case law on 
dealing with bias motives, see EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Unmasking Bias Mo-
tives in Crimes: Selected Cases of the European Court of Human Rights, 2018. url: https://
fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-unmasking-bias-motives- 
paper_en.pdf
40 Virabyan v Armenia, ECtHR, 40094/05, 2 January 2013.
41 Ibid, para. 157.
42 Ibid, para. 148.
43 Ibid, para. 200.
44 Ibid, para. 214.
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life and safety of members of a systematically disadvantaged group. It outlines 
a series of assaults and threats, over an extended period, against the applicant 
and her mother on the part of the former’s husband, culminating in the mur-
der of the applicant’s mother.45 Domestic violence is disproportionately tar-
geted at women, and is an entrenched problem which reinforces a weaker so-
cial position and compounds other factors leading to marginalisation and 
exclusion from the public sphere. In Opuz, fault was found with a legal frame-
work misaligned with “the status of women in a democratic and pluralistic so-
ciety”, with judicial passivity, the specific police treatment of the applicant and 
her mother, and a general approach prioritising mediation over investiga-
tion.46 Likewise, the failure to investigate appropriately crimes of violence 
against Roma individuals are highlighted in Šečić v Croatia and Škorjanec v 
Croatia.47 Here, racially motivated crimes of violence are singled out as requir-
ing special treatment in the investigative phase as they are especially destruc-
tive of fundamental rights.48 The underlying logic is outlined in Nachova and 
Others v Bulgaria, and as with Opuz, the emphasis is on pluralism, here ex-
pressed as the place of diversity in democratic societies:
… the authorities must use all available means to combat racism and rac-
ist violence, thereby reinforcing democracy’s vision of a society in which 
diversity is not perceived as a threat but as a source of enrichment.49
Such cases show the obligation on states to take action which deters violence 
both in the specific sense of serial violence against an individual and in the 
general sense of violence targeting groups on the basis of identity.
The conflict in the South East of Turkey provides the context for a number 
of cases dealing with the protection of life, several of which relate to victims in 
political roles (broadly defined) antagonistic to state objectives. This includes 
45 Opuz v Turkey, ECtHR, 33401/02, 9 June 2009, for the account of events accepted by the 
Court, see para. 133 i-viii.
46 Ibid, paras 192–195. Italics added. Other examples of a failure to protect individuals from 
socially marginalised categories include the failure to prevent recurring harassment of a 
man with physical and developmental disabilities in Đorđević v Croatia, ECtHR, 41526/10, 
24 July 2012.
47 Šečić v Croatia, ECtHR, 40116/02, 31 May 2007; Škorjanec v Croatia, ECtHR, 25536/14, 28 
March 2017.
48 Šečić, para. 67; Škorjanec, para. 53.
49 Nachova and Others v Bulgaria, ECtHR, 43577/98, 43579/98, 6 July 2005, para. 145, italics 
added.





10.1163/18750230-03001001 | security and human rights (2019) 1-28
newspaper vendors,50 journalists,51 members in political parties representing 
Kurdish interests,52 and union activists.53 While cases vary, they share a com-
mon feature of police authorities failing to act in light of threats to individuals, 
following which those individuals were killed.54 In the case of Hüseyin Koku, 
he was abducted by men apparently acting as plain clothes police officers, al-
though the police denied having taken him into custody. Subsequently, his 
family reported to the authorities receiving a telephone call in which Hüseyin 
could be heard being tortured, but no official action was initiated for two and 
a half months. Six months after the abduction his decomposed and dismem-
bered body was discovered.55 In the cases of Akkoç and Kılıç (respectively a 
trade unionist and a journalist), threats were reported to the authorities which 
the Court found to be indicative, of a “particular, real and immediate risk”.56 In 
both cases, these reports were followed by a lack of investigative and preven-
tive action57 and both Zübeyir Akkoç and Kemal Kılıç were shot dead while 
travelling between work and home. The lack of state action is situated in a 
context in of killings of opposition figures. A parliamentary report had detailed 
concerns over state security forces supporting or acquiescing in non-state ac-
tors’ killing of those “perceived to be acting against state interests”.58  Whether 
one assumes direct state involvement, a looser sense of acquiescence, or sim-
ply selective indifference towards the targeting of political opponents, it is 
clear that the resulting ineffective and iniquitous policing is a fundamen-
tal threat to participation in democratic politics, both in terms of the specific 
individuals killed and more generally by discouraging participation through 
fear of consequences. These cases indicate failures to act on credible informa-
tion regarding threats, and can be taken as examples of the kinds of  ‘well- defined 
50 Yaşa v Turkey, ECtHR, 63/1997/847/1054, 2 September 1998. This case found only a breach 
in the investigative arm and is not further discussed here.
51 Kılıç v Turkey, ECtHR, 22492/93, 28 March 2000. Similarly, although not in relation to the 
South East, but more generally in relation to Turkey’s minority Armenian population, see 
Dink v Turkey, ECtHR, 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 & 7124/09, 14 September 2010 
(French).
52 Koku v Turkey, ECtHR, 27305/95, 31 August 2005.
53 Akkoç v Turkey, ECtHR, 22947/93 and 22948/93, 10 October 2000.
54 In the later case of Dink v Turkey, ECtHR, 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 and 7124/09, 
14 October 2010, combining an Article 2 and Article 10 violation, the Court is explicit in 
connecting the positive obligation of protection falling on the state with the participation 
of all persons concerned in public debates (la participation aux débats publics de toutes les 
personnes concernées), para. 137.
55 Koku v Turkey, paras 19, 32 and 131–143.
56 Akkoç, para. 81; similar phrasing is used in Kılıç, para. 66.
57 Akkoç, para. 82; Kılıç, para. 76.
58 Akkoç, paras 83–84; Kılıç, para. 68.
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circumstances’ which generate an obligation on the state to undertake preven-
tive operations to protect individuals. That obligation is not unlimited. The 
Court recognises that unpredictability and finite resources are important con-
textual factors in setting out the likely circumstances in which the obligation 
stands.59
4.3 Dignity, Communicative Action and Belonging
Beyond this, Article 3 cases show police undermining individual dignity in 
ways which are anti-democratic. Ian Loader’s writings on police, security and 
politics often return to themes around the symbolic power exercised by po-
lice.60 Particularly, he writes that:
… policing is a social institution whose routine ordering and cultural 
work communicates authoritative meanings to individuals and groups 
about whether their voices are heard and claims recognised about where 
and in what ways they belong.61
And again he states that police ‘talk and action’ send ‘signals about whose voic-
es are to be heard or silenced’.62 The case law of the Court shows police action 
seriously infringing on individuals’ dignity. This need not involve physical vio-
lence as is evident in the humiliation and debasement deliberately inflicted on 
an applicant exposed in handcuffs at home and at his workplace.63 Cases fea-
turing physical violence also show other forms of humiliation. In Menesheva, 
the applicant, having been beaten and detained, was forced to wash the police 
station floor before being released.64 Cases of violence as an infringement of 
dignity range from a slap,65  through serious beating and electrocution,66 to 
59 For example, see Osman v The United Kingdom, ECtHR, 23452/94, 28 October 1998, paras 
115–116.
60 I. Loader, ‘Policing, Recognition and Belonging’, Annals of the American Academy of Politi-
cal and Social Science, 2006, no. 605, pp. 202–21. doi: 10.1177/0002716206286723; I. Loader 
and A. Mulcahy, Policing and the Condition of England: Memory, Politics and Culture, 2003, 
Clarendon, Oxford; I. Loader and N. Walker, Civilizing Security, 2007, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press.
61 Loader, ‘Policing, Recognition and Belonging’, p. 203.
62 Ibid, p. 211.
63 Erdoğan Yağız v Turkey, ECtHR, 27473/02, 6 March 2007, para. 47.
64 Menesheva v Russia, ECtHR, 59261/00, 9 March 2006, para. 21.
65 Bouyid v Belgium, ECtHR, 23380/09, 28 September 2015; Balogh v Hungary, 47940/99, 20 
October 2004.
66 Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v Ukraine, ECtHR, 4231/04, 21 April 2011.
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rape.67  These police acts are communicative. Among other messages, they 
convey that those at the receiving end, whether as individuals or as members 
of social groups or categories, are subject to police or state power while they 
themselves are disempowered. In a number of cases, the individuals are from 
groups that are already experiencing other forms of social marginalisation or 
disadvantage related to ethnicity, gender or class, and such attacks on dignity 
may compound this. The Court has noted how this contributes to feelings of 
arbitrariness, injustice and powerlessness.68
5 Policing for Democracy 2: Liberty (Article 5)
The key purpose of Article 5 is to prevent arbitrary or unjustified deprivations 
of liberty. The right not to be detained other than under defined lawful circum-
stances (Article 5.1, a-f) is given the highest priority as a feature of democratic 
societies, although again as a ‘strong’ right its interpretation and application is 
not limited by democracy.69 Recognising principles of operational indepen-
dence70 and discretion, the Court makes allowances for the fact that police 
decision making is complicated and is often based on factors not readily know-
able to others.71 Included in these decision-making processes may be a need to 
protect the convention rights of others, including the right to life.72 With 
this in mind, while there is an initial requirement of lawfulness at the point of 
detention, key procedural rights kick in after a decision on detention in or-
der  to provide a retrospective check against arbitrariness and speak largely 
to issues around responsiveness explored later. Such rights in turn stress the 
67 Maslova and Nalbandov v Russia, ECtHR, 839/02, 24 January 2008.
68 Bouyid v Belgium, para. 106.
69 McKay v the United Kingdom, ECtHR, 543/03, 3 October 2006, para. 30; Medvedev and oth-
ers v France, ECtHR, 3394/03, 29 March 2010, para. 76; Ladent v Poland, ECtHR, 11036/03, 18 
March 2008, para. 45. Ashworth and Redmayne, Criminal Process, at 38.
70 For a cautionary note on the use of operational independence to shield police policy from 
scrutiny, see A. Malik, Democracy and epistocracy reconciled? The Scottish Police Authority 
and police governance in Scotland after 2012, 2017, PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 
pp. 35–37.
71 P.F. and E.F. v The United Kingdom, ECtHR, 28326/09, Decision on Admissibility, 23 
 November 2010, para. 41; S., V. and A. v Denmark, ECtHR, 35553/12, 36678/12, 36711/12, 22 
October 2018, para. 123. On police control of privileged information and the limits of dem-
ocratic policing, see Harkin, ‘Simmel, the police form and the limits of democratic 
policing’.
72 Austin and others v The United Kingdom, ECtHR, 39692/09, 40713/09, 41008/09, 15 March 
2012, para. 55.
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 importance of maintaining records of detention, something lacking in a num-
ber of cases.73
As Neyroud and Beckley note, convention rights do not operate in isolation 
from one another.74 Article 5 can be seen operating in coordination with Arti-
cle 11 rights to freedom of assembly in the Frumkin case, in which police di-
verted and then terminated a political rally, and arrested, with others, the 
 applicant who was detained and convicted of an administrative violation. The 
Court noted both a targeted and general effect of discouraging engagement 
in  opposition politics and carried the “serious potential to deter opposition 
supporters and the public at large from attending demonstrations and, more 
 generally, from participating in open public debate”.75 Where this concerns 
 oppressive action against marginalised groups, defined by ethnicity and other 
characteristics, the reinforcement of marginalisation is a key concern for the 
inclusion of diverse groups in a safe and secure public sphere.76
6 Policing for Democracy 3: Political Rights (Articles 8 through 11 
and Protocol 1.3)
The rights concerned above are fundamental, in that without life or physi-
cal safety, provided equitably and effectively across society, the free and equal 
73 Anguelova v Bulgaria, ECtHR, 38361/97, 13 June 2002, para. 157; Menesheva v Russia, paras 
87 and 150. The ‘unacknowledged and incommunicado’ detention of Khaled El Masri in 
Skopje, with no custody records and no court authorisation, prior to his transfer to cia 
agents and removal to Afghanistan is perhaps one of the most egregious examples of an 
article 5 breach. El-Masri v “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, ECtHR, 39630/09, 
12 December 2012, particularly para. 237.
74 Neyroud and Beckley, Policing, Ethics and Human Rights, p. 63.
75 Frumkin v Russia, ECtHR, 74568/12, 5 January 2016, para. 141.
76 We also reviewed Article 7, concerning the principle of no punishment without law. The 
focus is on restricting findings of guilt and sentences of punishment only to those acts 
clearly defined in criminal law. This suggests, first and foremost, a focus on the criminal 
courts, their procedures and decisions. Nonetheless, as Harkin has set out, the police rou-
tinely deploy force in ways which deliver pain and which can be analysed in terms of 
punishment and punitiveness. Particularly, he identifies deprivation of liberty, of security 
and of autonomy as key pains delivered by police, whether ‘virtuously, justifiable, acci-
dentally, malicious or otherwise’. Notably these are matters covered by other articles, and 
so our review of Article 7 does not highlight significant cases dealing directly with po-
lice action. D. Harkin ‘The Police and Punishment: Understanding the Pains of Policing’, 
Theoretical Criminology, 2015, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 43–58, particularly 44–47. doi: 10.1177/ 
1362480614543043.
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enjoyment of political rights necessary to democracy is similarly absent. Those 
political rights are further protected from direct state infringement by Articles 
8 through 11. Their connection to democracy is strong, is reflected in Court de-
cisions, and where some infringements are accepted they are evaluated in 
terms of necessity in a democratic society.77 Each article is discussed in turn 
below. Protocol 1.3 protects free elections, but there is limited case law specifi-
cally concerning police. Harassment of election observers in Azerbaijan gives 
a clear example of policing contrary to the right and against democracy, but 
requires little further comment.78
6.1 Article 8: Privacy
Article 8 protects a number of important features in a democracy including 
the right to private correspondence and a wider principle of individual auton-
omy and self-realization. The limiting of state oversight is linked to the free-
flow of ideas between individuals, an awareness of the risk of self-policing, and 
of meaningful participation in democracy being reliant on having a space 
“separate from the pressures and conformities of collective life”.79 Two Russian 
cases examine state oversight of individuals’ private lives, and how far, when it 
amounts to interference, this is subject to judicial scrutiny (a point we return 
to on responsiveness, below). Both cases concern human rights activists. In 
Shimovolos, the key conclusion leading to the finding of violation of Article 8 is 
the basis of law in secret ministerial orders, and absence of public knowledge 
or opportunity for scrutiny. This in turn opens up the data collected to abuse, 
in this case to police obstruction of the individuals’ ability to pursue their ac-
tivities in the public sphere.80 The Zakharov case handles an equally inscruta-
ble and even wider surveillance scheme, and the applicant submits concerns 
about the anti-democratic possibilities of state data-collection. In this case, it 
is the opportunity for officers to accept bribes from politicians to unlawfully 
intercept rivals’ communications, thus undermining an open and fair demo-
cratic process.81 The Court was satisfied that rules governing the storage of and 
77 Ashworth and Redmayne, Criminal Process, at 37 and 43.
78 Namat Aliyev v Azerbaijan, ECtHR, 8705/06, 8 April 2010. Notably here, the Court focuses 
less on the facts and more on the failure of the subsequent processes to adequately ad-
dress the applicant’s arguable claim of interference.
79 B.J. Goold, ‘How much surveillance is too much? Some thoughts on surveillance, democ-
racy and the political value of privacy’, in D.W. Schartum (ed.) Overvåkning i en Rettstatt – 
Surveillance in a Constitutional Government, 2010, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, pp. 38–48, at 
42–44.
80 Shimovolos v Russia, ECtHR, 30194/09, 28 November 2011, para. 69.
81 Roman Zakharov v Russia, ECtHR, 47143/06, 4 December 2015, paras 253, 302–305.
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access to material collected through secret surveillance were sufficient to mini-
mise risks in this area but that overall the arrangements and practices regard-
ing supervision of the procedures were not sufficiently effective.82
As with other rights, Article 8 creates positive obligations on the state. 
These are evident in cases where threats to an individual based on aspects of 
their identity fall short of Article 3 violations, as seen in police and prosecu-
tion failures to investigate threats against Roma villagers during a series of 
far-right marches.83 The Court defines private life broadly in terms of a per-
sonal  autonomy embracing “multiple aspects of a person’s physical and social 
identity”.84 This can be linked to statements elsewhere about the value of plu-
ralism, and with points above on the communicative aspect of police action 
and inaction. The Court stresses the impact of negative stereotyping in terms 
of individuals’ sense of identity, self-worth and self-confidence85 which in-
forms their sense of their place in society. In the instant case, the Court noted 
the context of a pattern of violence and intolerance, generating an additional 
positive obligation on the state to respond.86
6.2 Article 9: Freedom of Conscience
Article 9, concerning freedom of conscience raises issues of the positive obli-
gation on police to protect equitably the convention rights. In the Gldani Con-
gregation case, in placing freedom of religion as a foundational aspect of 
 democracy, the Court identifies “public order, religious harmony and toler-
ance” as a key aspect of a democratic society.87 Here, the obligation is placed 
on the state to protect the free exercise of religious practice. In Gldani  Jehovah’s 
Witnesses were attacked in their meeting place. Members of the congregation 
cited numerous examples of appeals to police that were met with passive re-
sponses, outright refusals to intervene or statements indicating sympathy with 
the attackers.88 The leader of the attack stated publicly that he alerted po-
lice to any forthcoming attacks to secure their non-intervention, and this was 
82 Ibid, para. 253.
83 R.B. v Hungary, ECtHR, 64602/12, 12 April 2016.
84 Ibid, para. 78. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Wojtyczek rejects this interpretation, rather 
seeking to limit the concept of private life in ways which bring it closer to a concept of 
“autonomy and secrecy in personal matters”, suggesting that this would not include eth-
nic identity which is protected under other articles (particularly 3 and 14) and other inter-
national instruments.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid, para. 84.
87 97 Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and 4 Others v Georgia, 
ECtHR 71156/01, 3 May 2007, paras 129 & 132.
88 Ibid, para. 28.
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confirmed by ngos.89 The lack of impartiality and the police refusal to act to 
protect the members of a minority religion clearly act as a direct threat to plu-
ralism and to the spaces for different civic and religious groups to contribute to 
wider social and political life in a democratic context.
6.3 Article 10: Free Expression
In Article 10 cases concerning free expression, we focus on police action against 
the media and its impact on the free exchange of ideas and information. Sano-
ma Uitgevers against the Netherlands shows a free media as serving a key func-
tion in a democracy, to be protected from undue police interference. In this 
case, a car magazine was pressured into handing over material regarding an 
illegal street race which they had gathered under conditions of anonymity as 
part of an article on the phenomenon.90 The case hinged upon police and 
prosecutorial summonses to surrender photographic material. Only after the 
temporary arrest of a journalist, the threat of sealing and searching the com-
pany’s premises and removing all computers, and receiving the view (not le-
gally binding) of an investigating judge, did the company’s lawyer hand over a 
CD of photographs.91 The Court identifies freedom of expression as an essen-
tial foundation of a democratic society, key to societal progress and individual 
self-fulfilment. With specific reference to the press, it cites their role as a public 
watchdog and within this the importance of the freedom to receive and impart 
information and ideas without improper state interference.92 In the case un-
der consideration the Court deemed the credible threat to seal and search of-
fices, with an implication on the production and circulation of time sensitive 
news, an improper interference and, we can infer, anti-democratic.93 The im-
plications go beyond the specific case in raising the prospect of a broader 
‘chilling effect’ on the operation of a free media in relation to anonymous 
sources.94
A further case shows a combination of active interference and failures to 
protect with regard to the Özgür Gündem newspaper. As identified in relation 
to Article 2 and Article 3 cases above, the state was aware of violent acts being 
directed at those associated with the newspaper, including sellers, journal-
ists and other staff. Their failure to act falls short of positive obligations under 
89 Ibid, para. 36.
90 Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v The Netherlands, ECtHR 38224/03, 14 September 2010.
91 Ibid, paras 15–22.
92 Ibid, para. 50.
93 Ibid, para. 70.
94 Ibid, para. 71.
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Article 10 as well as Article 2 and Article 3.95 In this case, inaction was com-
pounded by further state actions, namely disproportionate and unjustified sei-
zures of the newspaper’s documents, archives and library and a mass arrest of 
all present at the newspaper’s offices, interfering with production and dissemi-
nation of the news.96 In the context of a publication antagonistic to state aims 
and policy, the Court reiterates the importance of the press in meeting a public 
right to “information and ideas on political issues, even divisive ones” and that 
this kind of communication is central to the public “discovering and forming 
an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders”.97
6.4 Article 11: Freedom of Assembly and Association
Public and private assembly is a key means by which citizens communicate 
with each other and with governing authorities. The case of Steel and Others v 
the United Kingdom covers Articles 10 and 11, as it concerns freedom of expres-
sion in the context of public assembly.98 The case examines three separate in-
stances of protest and police intervention: the protest against a grouse shoot 
(Steel), against a motorway extension (Lush), and against arms sales (Need-
ham, Polden and Cole). In each, applicants had been detained. The case shows 
the difference between lawful and legitimate interference with the rights, in 
the case of the first two applicants where the Court found arrest and detention 
proportionate to risks of physical injury and breach of the peace, and unlawful 
interference absent grounds to infer such risks from the peaceful leafleting by 
the three others.99 Remaining Article 11 cases of interest raise matters of secur-
ing safe demonstrations, and of necessity and proportionality when police 
close down public demonstrations, particularly spontaneous demonstrations 
taking place in a wider context of legal or administrative restrictions.
The Court recognises the fact that political demonstrations respond to 
events and so decisions to block them require effective and timely means for 
challenge.100 Further, even where the demonstrations are not authorised, the 
Court requires a degree of tolerance on the part of the police. This is evident 
when contrasting Eva Molnár’s application against Hungary with the case of 
Bukta v Hungary and three Turkish cases.101 In Molnár, unauthorised protests 
95 Özgür Gündem v Turkey, ECtHR, 23144/93, 16 March 2000, paras 43–46.
96 Ibid, para. 49.
97 Ibid, para. 58.
98 Steel and Others v the United Kingdom, ECtHR, 24838/94, 23 September 1998.
99 Ibid, paras 64, 104, 109 and 110.
100 Patyi v Hungary, ECtHR, 35127/08, 17 January 2012, para. 23.
101 Molnár v Hungary, ECtHR, 10346/05, 7 October 2008; Bukta and Others v Hungary, ECtHR, 
25691/04, 17 July 2007; Aldemir and Others v Turkey, ECtHR, 32124/02, 18 December 2007; 
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against the electoral authorities blocked traffic in central Budapest.102 The 
crowds, which had gathered in the early afternoon, were not dispersed until 9 
pm and the Court found that police had shown the “necessary tolerance”, giv-
ing protestors an acceptable period to exercise their rights before intervening 
to end disruption.103 In Bukta, protestors gathered before a hotel in response to 
the Prime Minister’s attendance at a commemorative event, made public just 
the day before. The demonstrators gave no notification of their intention to 
gather.104 Upon hearing a loud noise, the police decided to move demonstra-
tors away on security grounds. A domestic court found this lawful as demon-
strators had not given the required three days’ notice.105 Given this was a 
peaceful protest with only minor disturbance, ECtHR found the police fell 
short of the tolerance required.106 Similarly in Balcık, the Court was “struck by 
the authorities’ impatience” in bringing a demonstration to a close and the 
disproportionate nature of the intervention involving tear gas and trun-
cheons.107 Similar concerns are expressed in Oya Ataman108 and Aldemir,109  
with the explicit concern of the Court that such actions have a chilling effect 
on further demonstrations.110 The Court in Oya Ataman further notes the pos-
sibility of positive obligations to protect the effective enjoyment of the right to 
assembly.111 The Court had earlier resisted developing a ‘general theory’ of pos-
itive obligations arising from Article 11, but is clear that demonstrators must be 
able to proceed without fear of violence from opponents.112
To conclude this section, it is evident that the convention rights call on po-
lice to act in ways which do not damage and which protect wider democracy 
and the role of individuals and institutions in that democracy, and so we can 
observe a close overlap between human rights and policing for democracy. In 
numerous cases the police have failed to meet their obligations effectively or 
Balcık v Turkey, ECtHR, 63878/00, 26 April 2005; Oya Ataman v Turkey, ECtHR, 74552/01, 
5 December 2006.
102 Molnár v Hungary, para. 10.
103 Ibid, para 43–44. Similarly, after a period of 2 months of peaceful occupation and hunger-
strikes in a Church, the Court judged that police intervention was reasonable and that the 
protesters’ “presence had been tolerated sufficiently long enough”. Cisse v France, ECtHR, 
51346/99, 9 April 2002, para. 52.
104 Bukta v Hungary, paras 8–9.
105 Ibid, paras 10, 34.
106 Ibid, para. 37.
107 Balcık v Turkey, paras 51, 53.
108 Oya Ataman v Turkey, paras 41, 43.
109 Aldemir and Others v Turkey, paras 46–47.
110 Ibid, para. 34.
111 Oya Ataman v Turkey, para. 50.
112 Plattform “Ärzte fur das Leben” v Austria, ECtHR, 10126/82, 21 June 1988, paras 31–32.
Downloaded from Brill.com11/24/2020 01:04:39PM
via free access
 21Mapping Human Rights To Democratic Policing Through The Echr
<UN>
security and human rights (2019) 1-28 | 10.1163/18750230-03001001
equitably, particularly in relation to groups that are marginalised or disadvan-
taged, whether on grounds of ethnic identity, religion or gender. Further, both 
failure to act and more active breaches of rights show anti-democratic ele-
ments of policing where political and civil society sources of opposition to 
 governments are blocked in their efforts to challenge or hold to account the 
government of the day, a key aspect of democracy. The issue of accountability 
is one which can be transposed from the wider functions of government to the 
specific governance arrangements for the police. In the section that follows, we 
explore the case law of the Court through the lens of democratically respon-
sive policing – that is policing which does not simply support political democ-
racy, but which is governed, organised and implemented in a way which is 
 itself democratic, understood in terms of responsiveness.
7 Responsiveness and Convention Rights
As noted above, democratically responsive policing is characterised by a mas-
ter concept of responsiveness, itself divided into horizontal and vertical forms. 
The following analysis comes in two sections. The first handles mechanisms 
for vertical responsiveness, in which the police respond directly to the pub-
lic. The second examines instances where rights require a response to other 
institutions. As reaction and accessibility, measures of police responsiveness 
to  individual calls for service, are about protecting individuals, there is some 
overlap between the articles cited in the previous sections and here, particu-
larly Article 2 and 3. Beyond this, principles of distribution of power, access 
to information, accountability and redress bring in Articles 5, 6, 10 and 13. As 
we move from assessing police action to wider frameworks underpinning that, 
the value of a wider concept of a democratically responsive police system  
is clear.
7.1 Vertical Responsiveness: Citizens and Service Users
Vertical responsiveness means citizens have mechanisms to indicate their in-
terests to authorities and those authorities are required to respond in a mean-
ingful way. In this section we show the Court is attentive to citizens’ calls for 
service, in terms of accessibility and reaction, and through mechanisms for 
redress.113 Earlier we examined threats from the state and state failures to pro-
tect individuals from a known threat. This overlaps with a vertical response 
113 See Aitchison and Blaustein, ‘Policing for Democracy or Democratically Responsive Polic-
ing?’ p. 501.
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when members of the public call for preventive or protective police action. 
The Opuz case demonstrated the state’s failure to protect the physical safety of 
the applicant and the life of her mother. In relation to vertical responsiveness, 
the authorities consistently failed to read the applicant’s interests from her 
pattern of behaviour and from knowledge of domestic abuse. The government 
relied in part on the applicant’s repeated withdrawal of complaints to defend 
their lack of investigative and prosecutorial action,114 yet the Court found the 
authorities showed no effort to understand her motives. The interest indicated 
by the applicant’s initial call for help still necessitated action notwithstanding 
subsequent contradictory indicators. It requires a positive response, pursuing 
the initial complaint, and a negative response with reason, continuing after 
withdrawal of a complaint in light of other information about the specific situ-
ation and the general category in which it is located (domestic violence). The 
Court favours legal frameworks that allow continued investigation and prose-
cution despite the withdrawal of a complaint.115 Opuz and the wider issue of 
domestic violence highlight the limits of a reactive court and police service in 
terms of which citizens’ interests they can access and respond to. The Court 
notes that while domestic violence is a general problem in all member states, 
it “does not always surface”, remaining hidden in private spaces and personal 
relationships.116 People do not necessarily make even an initial call for help, 
and particular subgroups face obstacles to help-seeking.117 Both Mirza’s inter-
views and Opuz suggest that while the interest of an individual in life and secu-
rity is so fundamental, and state and police authorities need no special mecha-
nism to know this, threats to those interests can remain unknown to police for 
structural reasons, or when they are known, may not be given due priority.118
Individuals also communicate their interests in an investigative response 
after the event of the death of another or of serious injury. The police response 
to deaths, outside the bulk of those occurring under medical supervision, is 
normally to launch an investigation,119 so what is at issue for the Court is the 
114 Opuz v Turkey, para. 123.
115 Ibid, paras 143 and 168.
116 Ibid, para 132.
117 For example, see N. Mirza, ‘South Asian Women’s Experience of Family Abuse: Examining 
the Police Response’ sipr Research Summaries, No. 21, pp. 4–5. http://www.sipr.ac.uk/ 
Plugin/Publications/assets/files/Research_Summary_21.pdf.
118 See also Kontrová v Slovakia, ECtHR, 7510/04, 31 May 2007.
119 Notification of a death gives rise to an obligation to investigate, although that investiga-
tion need not take the form of a criminal investigation, Emars v Latvia, ECtHR, 22412/08, 
18 November 2014, paras 74, 77. Further in cases of suspected medical negligence, criminal 
investigations may be instigated at the request of next-of-kin, as seen in Byrzykowski v 
Poland, ECtHR, 11562/05, 27 June 2006, para. 108.
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adequacy of that investigative response.120 In relation to vertical responsive-
ness, the Court has emphasised the necessity in all cases following loss of life, 
to directly involve the victim’s next-of-kin “to the extent necessary to safeguard 
his or her legitimate interests”.121 Further, the provision of information is a key 
element of responsiveness,122  whether as a response to citizens or as a means 
to allow citizens to identify their needs and interests and signal these to the 
police. Failings in investigations, including in giving clear information to vic-
tims or their next of kin regularly occur and can amount not just to a failing 
under our heading of response, but can be grounds for a breach of Article 3 due 
to the suffering of those left excluded from an investigation.123
Redress124 includes another vertical response, particularly the possibility for 
citizens to challenge unfair treatment, or to have wrongs investigated and, 
where appropriate, properly compensated.125 The individual calls for their in-
terest to be recognised and this can influence subsequent police behaviour. We 
see this in Article 5.5 (compensation for detention in breach of right to liberty), 
Article 6 (entitlement to fair and public hearing) and Article 13 (right to effec-
tive remedy for violation of treaty rights). Many Article 5.5 cases arise from 
situations where the relevant aspects of the convention have not been fully 
incorporated into domestic law and so do not figure in legal reasoning and 
decision making in domestic courts. Applicants had been unable to have a 
complaint and claim for compensation examined nationally, as there had 
been  no determination at the national level that detention was unlawful.126 
Regarding Article 6 and 13, the related issues are often taken together under 
120 Examples of inadequate investigation including failure to secure key evidence or to follow 
central lines of questioning can be seen in Mulini v Bulgaria, ECtHR, 2092/08, 20 October 
2015, paras 46–47.
121 Emars v Latvia, para. 74.
122 Notably, we are extending beyond and individualising the principle of information out-
lined by Jones, Newburn and Smith, Democracy and Policing, pp. 47–48.
123 Luluyev and Others v Russia, ECtHR, 69480/01, 9 November 2006, para 117. In other cases, 
this goes further, to include the provision of false information to next-of-kin. See Timurtaş 
v Turkey, ECtHR, 23531/94, 13 June 2006, para. 97.
124 T. Jones, T. Newburn and D. Smith, ‘Policing and the Idea of Democracy’, British Journal of 
Criminology, 1996, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 192–198. doi: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.bjc.a014081.
125 Ibid, p. 192.
126 Rehbock v Slovenia, paras. 91–92; Yankov v Bulgaria, ECtHR, 39084/97, 11 December 2003, 
paras. 194–196; Sakık and others v Turkey, ECtHR, 23878/94, 23879/94, 23880/94, 23881/94, 
23882/94, 23883/94, 26 November 1997, para. 52; Harkmann v Estonia, ECtHR, 2192/03, 11 
July 2006, para. 52; Brogan and others v the United Kingdom, ECtHR, 11209/84, 11234/84, 
11266/84, 11386/85, 29 November 1988, para. 67; Nolan and K v Russia, ECtHR, 2512/04, 6 
July 2009, para. 104.
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Article 13, which is seen to be the broader of the two.127 A number of cases 
show how a lack of initial investigation by the police or related authorities into 
evident police misconduct has obstructed a remedy, either because there was 
no feasible alternative for a complainant to evidence their claim, or because 
remedies depended on outcomes in criminal processes.128 For example, Ege-
mez v Cyprus illustrates the necessity of state support when prosecution is the 
means of remedying police misconduct. The government claimed that private 
prosecution was a credible avenue for the complainant to pursue redress, but 
could offer no evidence of successful private prosecutions of police torture. 
Absent backing for prosecution from the Attorney General, the Court was not 
convinced this was an effective route to remedy.129
A number of UK cases highlight key features of systems of redress around 
issues of immunity, balance and independence. In Osman, the Court examines 
UK precedent which claimed to protect wider community interests in effec-
tive policing by preventing the police from being constantly exposed to the 
risk of “tortious liability for policy and operational decisions”.130 In the Court’s 
view, this amounts to blanket immunity, and obstructed the right of the appli-
cants to have their claim of police negligence examined.131 In Keegan, the con-
cern was not a blanket immunity but a requirement that the applicants would 
have to prove not simply police negligence in a wrongly targeted raid, rather 
malice. Setting the balance thus did not reflect the breach of Article 8 rights 
and the need for an effective mechanism of redress.132 Finally, Khan presents 
limitations to the then system for police complaints in England and Wales, 
showing a lack of clarity on the Police Complaints Authority’s power over and 
oversight of Chief Constables, and in its insufficiently independent relation-
ship towards the executive in terms of appointments and funding.133
127 Menteş v Turkey, ECtHR, 23186/94, 28 November 1997, para. 8; Giuliani and Gaggio v Italy, 
ECtHR, 23458/02, 24 March 2011, para. 335.
128 Salman v Turkey, ECtHR, 21986/93, 27 June 2000, paras 121–123, along with Menteş, pro-
vides an example of one of multiple similar Turkish cases; similar issues arise in El Masri 
v fyr Macedonia, Menesheva v Russia and Tsonchev v Bulgaria, ECtHR, 41488/98, 18 May 
2000. These can be contrasted to cases where remedies were not dependent on findings 
arising from criminal procedure, e.g. McKerr v the United Kingdom, ECtHR, 28883/95, 4 
May 2001; Giuliani and Gaggio v Italy.
129 Egemez v Turkey, ECtHR, 30873, 21 December 2000.
130 Osman vUK, para. 149.
131 Ibid, para. 150.
132 Keegan v the United Kingdom, ECtHR, 28867/03, 18 July 2006, para. 42.
133 Khan v the United Kingdom, ECtHR, 35394/97, 12 May 2000, paras 45–47; reiterated in P.G. 
and J.H. v the United Kingdom, ECtHR, 44787/98, 25 September 2001.
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Finally, building on Loader and Walker’s discussion of recognition,134  the 
mechanisms of redress outlined here go beyond citizens to provide a means by 
which non-citizens are included in processes of contestation regarding pro-
cesses and actions affecting them.135 Recognition, as a principle of civilized se-
curity calls for inclusive mechanisms that give voice to ‘the interests and ideas 
of those who can reasonably claim a stake in the outcome’ of a state’s decisions 
and actions.136 Non-citizens excluded from democratic participation in other 
fora nonetheless have an entitlement to systems of remedy, redress and com-
pensation as a feedback mechanism.
That said, concerns have been raised about the impact of the Court acting 
as a venue for individual claims of redress, and as an adjudicator of claims 
that could have been settled within states with proper integration of the con-
vention into domestic law, on the capacity of the Court to fill a wider role of 
 constitutional adjudication and harmonisation at or above a set of minimum 
standards of rights protection.137 This is not to say the Court has no role in en-
suring redress, rather that this purpose may be better served by the Court’s 
wider governance role in supervising states’ own systems of redress rather than 
by direct delivery of redress through judgments.
7.2 Horizontal Responsiveness: Landscapes of Governance
Finally, we examine the Court’s role in a horizontal democratic plurarchy, 
where multiple bodies are arranged in a landscape of governance to best rep-
resent and balance citizens’ interests. The totality of the cases already present-
ed suggests the ECtHR fits such a framework as police authorities are repeat-
edly critiqued and states sanctioned for infringing rights, failing to protect 
individuals and acting in ways that are inattentive, or detrimental, to equity. 
Yet Kuper is clear that the requirements of horizontal responsiveness go well 
beyond a strong judicial check. He suggests that the judiciary are limited by the 
legal form, jurisprudential logic and distance from political engagement that is 
a condition of their autonomy.138 Courts are not active seekers of complaints, 
do not educate the public on their rights, nor do they compensate for weak 
134 Loader and Walker, Civilizing Security, pp. 220 ff.
135 See e.g. M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, ECtHR, 30696/09, 21 January 2011 and El Masri v fyr 
Macedonia, dealing respectively with Afghan and a German citizens.
136 Loader and Walker, p. 220.
137 S. Greer, ‘What’s wrong with the European Convention on Human Rights’, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 2008, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 680–702, at 680, 684 and 692; de Londras, ‘Dual function-
ality’ at 42–43.
138 Ibid, p. 109.
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civil society institutions as substitute advocates of policy change.139 In short, 
courts’ operating conditions are not geared towards compromise and consen-
sus and they are reactive rather than proactive. Against these limitations, there 
are two ways in which the Court could function as part of a system of horizon-
tal responsiveness. First, by exploring the margin of appreciation allowed by 
echr, we might question the suggested judicial rigidity that Kuper sees as an 
obstacle to consensus and compromise. Second, we present Court judgments 
in support of other institutions in a landscape of governance and favouring 
principles of accountability, distribution of power and information.
The margin of appreciation is a means to balance national constitutional 
values with the universality of human rights, but applies to how and in what 
circumstances states can limit rights, rather than the actual substance of the 
rights. It links Kuper’s epistemic framing in that national authorities are viewed 
as “best placed to assess the necessity and appropriateness of restrictions and 
limitations”.140 That is, the executive’s particular political knowledge is given 
due weighting. While Gerards has concerns about inconsistent specification 
and reasoning when the Court applies the margin, she still favours other ways 
in which the Court handles divisive matters by a gradual approach, with a 
strong emphasis on the individual facts in a case.141 Young, in a different con-
text, argues that appropriate deference from courts to legislatures and execu-
tives is about the recognition of expertise, knowledge and access to evidence 
in those branches.142 As such, the rigidity perceived by Kuper is reduced in the 
specific case of ECtHR, and recognition of other authorities’ alternative sourc-
es and modes of knowledge triggers the Court’s mechanisms of compromise 
and consensus.
In several cases, the judgment and reasoning of the ECtHR offers support to, 
or is suggestive of standards of effectiveness in domestic institutions, but 
 often these are courts and would face the limitations as part of a framework of 
horizontal responsiveness outlined by Kuper. In Gutsanovi, the Court notes 
that prior judicial review of a police operation would have allowed for a proper 
weighing of legitimate interests of those affected against the public interest in 
arrest.143 In Delta and Palaoro respectively, the domestic courts are a necessary 
139 Ibid.
140 J. Gerards, ‘Margin of Appreciation and Incrementalism in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights’, in Human Rights Law Review, 2018, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 495–515, at 
pp. 496 and 498. doi: 10.1093./hrlr/ngy017.
141 Ibid, pp. 508, 512.
142 A. Young. ‘In Defence of Due Deference’, in Modern Law Review, 2009, vol. 72, no. 4, 
pp. 554–580, at pp. 555 and 570.
143 Gutsanovi v Bulgaria, para. 133.
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venue to test knowledge generated in police investigations and the technology 
used by police.144 In Zakharov, we saw how Article 8 was breached by the lack 
of an effective and proactive judiciary, or alternative independent supervisory 
arrangements, providing oversight of covert surveillance. This is especially 
true given the lack of possibility for an individual to challenge the, generally 
secret, measures themselves. Collectively, the cases emphasise the value of in-
dependent checks and kinds of evidence and reasoning that courts provide, 
suggesting the value of alternative epistemic frameworks.145
In different ways, the ECtHR supports other institutions with a less formal, 
but nonetheless important, role in the landscape of police governance. Article 
10 cases reviewed earlier stress the role of the press in a wider political democ-
racy. Further cases involve the freedom of the press to act as a check on police 
misconduct.146 Finally, the ECtHR is a venue in which ngos and other groups 
can voice their concerns in relation to the interests of sections of society of 
whom they have specific knowledge. A review of cases up to 2013 shows 142 
ngos providing 294 briefs across 237 cases under provisions in Article 44.3(a) 
of the ECtHR rules.147 In a number of cases, for example, the European Roma 
Rights Centre, Interights and the Open Society Justice Initiative have inter-
vened in ways that provide the Court with important contextual knowledge on 
marginalisation and victimisation of Roma. This may push at the boundaries 
of the notion of a democratically responsive police system as we get further 
away from executive and judicial bodies, but a system can consist of multiple 
components, some more central than others, just as in a landscape of gover-
nance some elements may be central and others peripheral.
8 Conclusion
In examining the conceptual overlap between human rights and the two 
separate forms of democratic policing, our analysis strengthens the case for 
separating out these two elements. The conceptual mapping and the analysis 
of ECtHR have shown a strong close match between convention rights and 
144 Delta v France, ECtHR, 11444/85, 19 December 1990; Palaoro v Austria, ECtHR, 16718/90, 23 
October 1995.
145 Zakharov v Russia, particularly paras 233, 257, 259 and 274–281.
146 Sürek v Turkey ii, ECtHR, 24122/94, 8 July 1999, paras 37–39; Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland, 
ECtHR, 13778/88, 25 June 1992; Tillack v Belgium, ECtHR, 20477/05, 27 November 2007.
147 L. van den Eynde, ‘An Empirical Look at the Amicus Curaie Practice of Human Rights 
ngos before the echr’, in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2013, vol. 31, no. 3, 
pp. 271–313, at 271, 278. doi10.1177/016934411303100304.
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the concept of policing for democracy. Particularly through Articles 2, 3 5 and 
8 through 11, taken alongside Article 14, the Court sets out circumstances in 
which police action or inaction serves, or fails to serve, the wider aims and 
values of a democratic society, understood in terms of pluralism. As such, 
policing for rights and policing for democracy cover much of the same ter-
ritory. With regards to democratically responsive policing, the ‘fit’ is less per-
fect. We have argued that the Court is a mechanism of response (vertically, 
in terms of redress, and horizontally in holding states to account), but that 
a wider set of institutional checks is required to fully meet Kuper’s require-
ments. While some of his observations on the limitations of courts may be 
overstated, and in line with concerns stated in relation to the Court as a means 
of redress, it remains true that the Court is focused on individual cases rather 
than policy change. While states are “allowed and encouraged” to “draw broad-
er inferences” from Court judgments, they are in no way obliged to.148 Still, 
the case law examined here provides valuable resources for those who seek to 
interrogate and analyse domestic legislation and other institutional arrange-
ments to ensure that police actions support democratic values, and are them-
selves   democratically governed. Future work can build on this by extending 
to other international settings or with more detailed examinations of specific 
jurisdictions.
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